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Is Three a Crowd: Small Group Provision of a Public Good 
Appendix 
 
Derivation of eq. (2) 
 
After substituting the expressions (1) into the utility function M can easily be factored out of 
the expression.  Note too that 𝜎 = 1
1+𝜌
  ⇒𝜌 = 1−𝜎
𝜎
 ⇒−1
𝜌
= 𝜎
𝜎−1
.  Also, 𝜎 = 1 − 𝜌𝜎. 
 
Derivation of eq. (3) 
𝑈(𝑚) = {𝑎 [
𝑀𝑎𝜎
𝑎𝜎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎( 1𝑚)
1−𝜎]
−𝜌
+ (1 − 𝑎) [
𝑀(1 − 𝑎)𝜎( 1𝑚)
−𝜎
𝑎𝜎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎( 1𝑚)
1−𝜎]
−𝜌
}
−1𝜌
 
 
= 
𝑀
𝑎𝜎+(1−𝑎)𝜎( 1𝑚)
1−𝜎 {𝑎
1−𝜎𝜌 + (1 − 𝑎)1−𝜎𝜌( 1
𝑚
)
𝜎𝜌
}
1
−𝜌
 
= 
𝑀
𝑎𝜎+(1−𝑎)𝜎( 1𝑚)
1−𝜎 {𝑎
𝜎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎( 1
𝑚
)
1−𝜎
}
𝜎
𝜎−1
 
= 𝑀 {𝑎𝜎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎 (
1
𝑚
)
1−𝜎
}
1
𝜎−1
 
 
Derivation of eq. (4) 
Equate UL and U(m): 
𝑀(𝑎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎(𝑎)1−𝜎)
𝜎
𝜎−1 = 𝑀 {𝑎𝜎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎 (
1
𝑚
)
1−𝜎
}
1
𝜎−1
 
 
Cancel the M term, and take both sides of the equation to the power Re-arranging 
and taking the 1
𝜎−1
th root yields eq. (4). 
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1. Partial Co-operation: Quasi-linear Utility 
 
Individual i maximises Ui = xi + Gsubject to Mi + G-i = xi + G, with 0 < 

Here G-i is the total amount donated to the public good by all individual except i.  Given that 
MRSGx = G 𝐺 =  (𝛽𝛼)
1
1−𝛼we have:
  
𝑈𝐿 = 𝑀 + 𝛽(𝛽𝛼)
𝛼
1−𝛼 
 
As a member of a trusting group of size m, individual i would solve: 
 
Max 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽𝐺
𝛼 subject to 𝑀𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 +
1
𝑚
𝐺 
As MRSGx G 1𝑚  𝐺 =  (𝑚𝛽𝛼)
1
1−𝛼and 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑀 −
1
𝑚
(𝑚𝛽𝛼)
1
1−𝛼 
We have: 
 𝑈𝑚 = 𝑀 −
1
𝑚
(𝑚𝛽𝛼)
1
1−𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑚𝛽𝛼)
𝛼
1−𝛼 
UL = Um    𝛽(𝛽𝛼)
𝛼
1−𝛼 = − 1
𝑚
(𝑚𝛽𝛼)
1
1−𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑚𝛽𝛼)
𝛼
1−𝛼 
 𝛽(𝛽𝛼)
𝛼
1−𝛼 (1 − 𝑚
𝛼
1−𝛼) = − 1
𝑚
(𝑚𝛽𝛼)
1
1−𝛼 
 
𝛽(𝛽𝛼)
𝛼
1−𝛼
(𝛽𝛼)
1
1−𝛼
=
−𝑚
𝛼
1−𝛼
(1−𝑚
𝛼
1−𝛼)
 
 1
𝛼
= 1
1−𝑚
−
𝛼
1−𝛼
 
 𝑚 = (1 − 𝛼)−
1−𝛼
𝛼  
 
Now establish some key properties of the m function: 
Property 1 
→ 0 ⇒ m → e 
Proof 
Define y such that (1 + y) = (1    
 
From this we have y(1 + y)-1 
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Hence 𝑚 = (1 + 𝑦)
1
1+𝑦
𝑦
1+𝑦 = (1 + 𝑦)
1
𝑦 
Now lim
𝑦→0
(1 + 𝑦)
1
𝑦 = 𝑒.  Hence, as y → 0 ⇒ a → 0 the proposition is proved.  Q.E.D. 
 
Property 2 
→ 1 ⇒ m → 1 
Proof 
Take the natural log of 𝑚 = (1 + 𝑦)
1
𝑦:   ln 𝑚 =  1
𝑦
ln(1+𝑦) 
Note that →⇒y → ∞. 
Using L’Hôpital’s Rule, lim
𝑦→∞
ln 𝑚 =  lim
𝑦→∞
1
𝑦
ln(1+𝑦)= lim
𝑦→∞
1
(1+𝑦)
 = 0 
Hence: →⇒m → 1         Q.E.D. 
 
Property 3 
𝑑𝑚
𝑑𝛼
< 0 for 0 <  
 
Proof 
From m = (1 − 𝛼)−
1−𝛼
𝛼  we have: 
 
𝑑𝑚
𝑑𝛼
=  
𝑚
𝛼2
[ln(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼] 
 
Now consider the function z = eThis equals one whenDifferentiating with 
respect toyields 
 
𝑑𝑧
𝑑𝛼
= −𝛼𝑒𝛼 < 0 
 
Thus for e < 1.  Hence: 
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ln(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼 < 0 
 
From which it follows that 
𝑑𝑚
𝑑𝛼
< 0  Q.E.D. 
 
The conclusion is that with this family of utility functions m ∈ (1, e).  Thus either two or 
three mutually trusting individuals suffice to undermine the Nash Equilibrium. 
 
A Generalised CES Function 
Now consider the generalised CES utility function  
  
𝑈 = [𝑎(𝑥 − 𝛽1)
−𝜌 + (1 − 𝑎)(𝐺 − 𝛽2)
−𝜌]−
1
𝜌  
 
From this we can derive: 
 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐺𝑥 = (
1−𝑎
𝑎
) (𝑥−𝛽1
𝐺−𝛽2
)
𝜌+1
 
 
With the unit normalisation and x = M at the limit we can derive GL: 
 
 𝐺𝐿 = (
1−𝑎
𝑎
)
𝜎
(𝑀 − 𝛽1) + 𝛽2 
 
Hence we can write: 
 
𝑈𝐿 = (𝑀 − 𝛽1) [𝑎 + (1 − 𝑎)((
1−𝑎
𝑎
)
𝜎
)
−𝜌
]
−1
𝜌
= (𝑀 − 𝛽1)[𝑎 + (1 − 𝑎)
𝜎𝑎1−𝜎]
𝜎
𝜎−1  
 
Note that 2 drops out of this equation as at the limit agents do not contribute to the public 
good.   
 
Utility for each of the m co-operators is easy to determine.  Just note that each agents must 
spend on good x and m-1remember that the coalition shares costs equally) before any 
utility can be gained.  Hence, income available for expenditure on utility is: 
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 𝑀 − 𝛽1 −
𝛽2
𝑚
 
Substitute this for M in the equation for utility (equation 3 in the text):  
𝑈(𝑚) =  (𝑀 − 𝛽1 −
𝛽2
𝑚
) {𝑎𝜎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎 (
1
𝑚
)
1−𝜎
}
1
𝜎−1
 
Hence the minimum value of m is found by solving the following equation: 
 (𝑀 − 𝛽1 −
𝛽2
𝑚
) {𝑎𝜎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎( 1
𝑚
)
1−𝜎
}
1
𝜎−1
= (𝑀 − 𝛽1)[𝑎 + (1 − 𝑎)
𝜎𝑎1−𝜎]
𝜎
𝜎−1 
⇒ (𝑀 − 𝛽1 −
𝛽2
𝑚
)𝑎
𝜎
𝜎−1 {1 + (1−𝑎
𝑎
)
𝜎
( 1
𝑚
)
1−𝜎
}
1
𝜎−1
= (𝑀 − 𝛽1)𝑎
𝜎
𝜎−1[1 + (1−𝑎
𝑎
)
𝜎
]
𝜎
𝜎−1 
 ⇒(𝑀 − 𝛽1 −
𝛽2
𝑚
) {1 + (1−𝑎
𝑎
)
𝜎
( 1
𝑚
)
1−𝜎
}
1
𝜎−1
= (𝑀 − 𝛽1)[1 + (
1−𝑎
𝑎
)
𝜎
]
𝜎
𝜎−1 
The first version is the equation given in the text in implicit form, but it does not in general 
have an analytical solution.  However, note that if  = 0 it can easily be checked that from 
the key equality in section 2 that the solution collapses to the C.E.S. case. 
Define: 
 𝑓(𝑚, 𝑀, 𝑎, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝜎) = (𝑀 − 𝛽1 −
𝛽2
𝑚
) {𝑎𝜎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎( 1
𝑚
)
1−𝜎
}
1
𝜎−1
− (𝑀 − 𝛽1)[𝑎 +
(1 − 𝑎)𝜎𝑎1−𝜎]
𝜎
𝜎−1 
Key Properties 
𝑓𝑚 =
𝛽2
𝑚2
{𝑎𝜎+(1−𝑎)𝜎( 1
𝑚
)
1−𝜎
}
1
𝜎−1
+(𝑀−𝛽1−
𝛽2
𝑚
)
1
𝜎−1
{𝑎𝜎+(1−𝑎)𝜎( 1
𝑚
)
1−𝜎
}
2−𝜎
𝜎−1(1 − 𝑎)𝜎(𝜎 − 1)𝑚𝜎−2> 0 
Hence for any set of parameters there is a unique value for m. 
For 2 = 0 the equation for m becomes: 
{𝑎𝜎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎 (
1
𝑚
)
1−𝜎
}
1
𝜎−1
= [𝑎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎𝑎1−𝜎]
𝜎
𝜎−1 
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Take both sides to the power and solve for m.  The equation is the same as in section 
2. 
𝑓𝛽2 = −
1
𝑚
{𝑎𝜎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎(1
𝑚
)
1−𝜎
}
1
𝜎−1
< 0  
From this it follows that 
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝛽2
> 0. 
 
Finally we have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition  
a  → 1 ⇒ m  → ∞ 
Proof 
(𝑀 − 𝛽1 −
𝛽2
𝑚
) {𝑎𝜎 + (1 − 𝑎)𝜎 (
1
𝑚
)
1−𝜎
}
1
𝜎−1
= (𝑀 − 𝛽1)[𝑎 + (1 − 𝑎)
𝜎𝑎1−𝜎]
𝜎
𝜎−1 
 
First note that m is determined by the equation.  Suppose, contrary to the Proposition, that 
m is bounded as a → 1, and that  > 1.   If so, the expressions inside the second set of 
brackets on each side of the equation converge to unity, so that to preserve the equality m 
in the first set of brackets on the left hand side must go to infinity.  Hence we have a 
contradiction, and so m → ∞.  
Suppose now that  < 1.  Again suppose that m is bounded.  The second of each pair of 
brackets still converge to unity, which again requires m to converge to infinity.  The same 
contradiction proves the proposition.    Q.E.D. 
The case of  = 1 is the Stone-Geary utility function for which the solution is given by   
 
𝛼𝑚 − 𝑚𝛼 = 𝛼𝛽2
(𝑀−𝛽1)
     
 
Divide through by m: 
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 𝛼 − 𝑚𝛼−1 = 𝛼𝛽2𝑚
−1
(𝑀−𝛽1)
 
 
Here if → 1 the left hand side must converge to zero.  Equality can only be preserved if m 
→ ∞. 
Note that neither of these proofs apply if 2 = 0. 
For information here is the working for the Stone-Geary utility function. 
 
The Stone-Geary Utility Function 
 
The utility function is now U = (x - G We first find the limit solution with x = M. 

 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐺𝑥 = (
1−𝛼
𝛼
) (𝑀−𝛽1
𝐺−𝛽2
) = 1  𝐺 = (1−𝛼
𝛼
)(𝑀 − 𝛽1) + 𝛽2 
 
Hence: 
 
 𝑈𝐿 = (𝑀 − 𝛽1)
𝛼[(1−𝛼
𝛼
)(𝑀 − 𝛽1)]
1−𝛼
= (𝑀 − 𝛽1)(
1−𝛼
𝛼
)
1−𝛼
 
 
To find the partial co-operative solution solve: 
 
Max U = (x - G -  subject to 𝑀 = 𝑥 + 1
𝑚
𝐺 
 
𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐺𝑥 = (
1−𝛼
𝛼
) (𝑀−𝛽1
𝐺−𝛽2
) = 1
𝑚
    𝐺 = (1−𝛼
𝛼
)𝑚(𝑥 − 𝛽1) + 𝛽2 
 
Substitute into the budget constraint 
𝑀 = 𝑥 +
1
𝑚
(
1−𝛼
𝛼
) 𝑚(𝑥 − 𝛽1) +
𝛽2
𝑚
 
Solve for x: 
 𝑥 = 𝛼𝑀 + (1 − 𝛼)𝛽1 −
𝛼𝛽2
𝑚
 
And for G: 
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 𝐺 = 𝑚(1 − 𝛼)𝑀 − 𝑚𝛽1(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼𝛽2 
So that: 
 
 𝑈𝑚 = [𝛼𝑀 + (1 − 𝛼)𝛽1 −
𝛼𝛽2
𝑚
− 𝛽1]
𝛼
[𝑚(1 − 𝛼)𝑀 − 𝑚𝛽1(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼𝛽2 − 𝛽2]
1−𝛼 
       = [𝛼𝑀 − 𝛼𝛽1 −
𝛼𝛽2
𝑚
]
𝛼
[𝑚(1 − 𝛼)𝑀 − 𝑚𝛽1(1 − 𝛼) − (1 − 𝛼)𝛽2]
1−𝛼 
     =𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛼)(1−𝛼)[𝑀 − 𝛽1 −
𝛽2
𝑚
]
𝛼
[𝑚𝑀 − 𝑚𝛽1 − 𝛽2]
1−𝛼 
 
A co-operative group of size m would form if: 
 
 (𝑀 − 𝛽1)(
1−𝛼
𝛼
)
1−𝛼
≤ 𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛼)(1−𝛼)[𝑀 − 𝛽1 −
𝛽2
𝑚
]
𝛼
[𝑚𝑀 − 𝑚𝛽1 − 𝛽2]
1−𝛼 
 (𝑀 − 𝛽1) ≤ 𝛼[𝑀 − 𝛽1 −
𝛽2
𝑚
]
𝛼
[𝑚𝑀 − 𝑚𝛽1 − 𝛽2]
1−𝛼 
Multiply through by m     
𝑚𝛼(𝑀 − 𝛽1) ≤ 𝛼[𝑀𝑚 − 𝑚𝛽1 − 𝛽2]
𝛼[𝑚𝑀 − 𝑚𝛽1 − 𝛽2]
1−𝛼 
𝑚𝛼(𝑀 − 𝛽1) ≤ 𝛼[𝑀𝑚 − 𝑚𝛽1 − 𝛽2] 
Re-arranging: 
𝛼𝛽2 ≤ 𝑀(𝛼𝑚 − 𝑚
𝛼) − 𝛽1(𝛼𝑚 − 𝑚
𝛼) 
 
So we find the minimum size of m from the equation: 
𝛼𝑚 − 𝑚𝛼 = 𝛼𝛽2
(𝑀−𝛽1)
     
 
The implicit function f(m, M) = 𝛼𝑚 − 𝑚𝛼 − 𝛼𝛽2(𝑀−𝛽1) = 0 determines m given that: 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑚
= 𝛼 − 𝛼𝑚𝛼−1 > 0  (given     
 
From this we can derive: 
 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝛼
= 𝑚 − 𝑚𝛼 ln 𝑚 −
𝛽2
(𝑀−𝛽1)
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For  close to zero this will be positive as long as is not too large.  For  close to unity the 
derivate will be negative if m < e.  From this it follows that the derivative 
 
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝛼
= −
𝑚−ln(𝑚)𝑚𝛼−
𝛽2
(𝑀−𝛽1)
𝛼(1−𝑚𝛼−1)
 
 
cannot be signed in general.  However, there is a presumption that it will be negative when 
 is small and positive when  is large.   
The remaining properties of the m function are easy to settle: 
 
 𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑀
=
𝛽2
(𝑀−𝛽1)
2 > 0  
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑀
< 0 
 
 𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝛽1
= − 𝛼𝛽2
(𝑀−𝛽1)
2 < 0  
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝛽1
> 0 
 
 𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝛽2
= − 𝛼
(𝑀−𝛽1)
< 0  
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝛽2
> 0 
 
The Commons 
Individuals maximise Ui = Ui(zi, G) subject to the budget constraint Mi = xi + pyi with  
zi = axi + byi and G = G-i - yi, b > ap. 
Eliminate xi from the zi equation using the budget constraint: 
  
 zi = a(Mi – pyi) + byi = aMi + (b – ap)yi 
 
Note that for any individual i G = G-i − yi.  By substituting this into zi to eliminate yi we have: 
 
 𝑧𝑖 = 𝑎𝑀𝑖 + (
𝑏−𝑎𝑝
𝛽
) (𝐺−𝑖 − 𝐺)  
⇒ 𝑎𝑀𝑖 + (
𝑏−𝑎𝑝
𝛽
) 𝐺−𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖 + (
𝑏−𝑎𝑝
𝛽
) 𝐺 
 
This is the equation for the budget constraint that appears on Figure 9. 
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Hence individual i’s utility maximum problem can be written as:  
 Max Ui = Ui(zi, G)  
Subject to 𝑀𝑖 + (
𝑏−𝑎𝑝
𝛽𝑎
) 𝐺−𝑖 = (
1
𝑎
)𝑧𝑖 + (
𝑏−𝑎𝑝
𝛽𝑎
) 𝐺 
As G-i changes the budget line on Figure 9 shifts up and down.  From this we derive the 
Income Expenditure Path. 
The line of symmetry is derived simply: 
 z = aM + (b – ap)y ⇒ nz = naM + (b – ap)ny 
We also know that with identical agents the total damage done to the commons is given by: 
 (?̅? − 𝐺) = ny 
Solving this equation for ny and substituting this into the equation for nz we have: 
 𝑛𝑧 = 𝑛𝑎𝑀 + (𝑏−𝑎𝑝
𝛽
) (?̅? − 𝐺) 
⇒ 𝐺 = ( 𝛽𝑛𝑎
𝑏−𝑎𝑝
) 𝑀 +  ?̅? − ( 𝛽𝑛
𝑏−𝑎𝑝
) 𝑧 
This is the equation of the symmetry line that appears on Figure 9. 
 
